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Governing through Normality: Law and the Force of Sameness  
 
Abstract This article claims that the existence of social groups hinges on the production of sameness, 
which allows distinguishing members from non-members. Sameness is described as a shared set of 
standards whereby social subjects can provide mutually understandable accounts of themselves, their 
practical activities, and their environment. The author argues that sameness is not an intrinsic property 
of groups, but is produced within the very practices that it is meant to support. By building on a 
Wittgensteinian interpretation of meanings and rules, he illustrates how sameness is an intrinsic 
feature of the process through which the members of a practice construct the latter by establishing its 
rules. At the same time, the article draws on Carl Schmitt’s institutional thinking, elaborated in the 
1930s, and particularly his analysis of the relevance of normality to the existence of law. In doing so, 
the author claims that sameness and normality are key, co-original aspects of there being an effective 
legal order. Against this analytical background, the article goes on to claim that the legal orders typical 
of liberal regimes hold sway on social practices through the protection of normality and the revision 
of its boundaries as new challenges arise. As a case in point, the author examines the hypothesis that 
today’s push for legal recognition of same-sex marriage could be interpreted as an immunity response 
of liberal regimes to homosexual sexualities’ former critique of traditional models of kinship.  
 
 
Constructing sameness is an essential intellectual activity that goes unobserved 
(Douglas 1987, p. 60) 
 
What is it that produces sameness? This is one of the most troubling questions for those who 
endeavour to understand how social order comes about and works. With no shred of doubt, this 
question has haunted the works of two major figures of the 20th century, Carl Schmitt and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who have explored both the semantic implications of sameness and its pragmatic effects 
on the regulation of social interaction. Some scholars have drawn on Schmitt’s and Wittgenstein’s 
critical reflections to highlight the limits of liberalism (e.g. Mouffe 2000). Others have examined 
some of the connections among their theoretical concerns (e.g. Sluga 2011). Seldom, however, do 
interpreters pay due heed to Schmitt’s and Wittgenstein’s shared interest in the role of sameness and 
the way in which it helps produce conditions of normality. In the view of both, sameness and 
normality constitute the binary that enables social groups to exist qua groups, that is, to share 
standards of conducts and criteria of correctness. On this account, sameness can be conceptualised as 
the common reference to a set of criteria that confer social intelligibility and political speakability on 
social subjects. Put otherwise, sameness should not be regarded as a set of substantial properties that 
determine the homogeneity or the identity of social entities. It is rather a conceptual, cognitive devices 
that denotes, and draws the boundaries of, the “socially legible”, in that it offers the standards whereby 
social subjects provide mutually understandable accounts of themselves, their practical activities, and 
their environment.  
In the first three sections, I will mainly look at Wittgenstein’s and Schmitt’s insights into how 
sameness emerges and why it turns out to be so crucial to social order. On the one hand, Wittgenstein 
lays the theoretical foundation for the analysis of sameness, as he explains that the latter stems from, 
and depends on, a threefold relation among the creation of meanings, the observance of rules, and the 
development of practices. On the other hand, Schmitt’s significant revision of the role of exception 
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and his introduction of an institutionalist point of view emphasise the importance of the government 
of sameness for the stability and vigour of a political community.  
Despite Wittgenstein’s and Schmitt’s relevance to my argument, however, the main purpose of 
this article is not to identify similarities and convergences between such notable and (for different 
reasons) controversial theorists. I will discuss them insofar as their analysis revolves around 
normality, an element of social life that other prominent authors, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Mary 
Douglas, consider to be key to understanding social order. Accordingly, in the other sections I will 
move on to the main concern of this article. I will use the analytical framework developed in the first 
three sections to understand how the liberal law1 governs normality, creates sameness, and responds 
to problematic situations in which sameness appears to be in jeopardy. The hypothesis I will advance 
is that governing society entails regulating social practices by protecting the type of sameness 
produced within them. 
To substantiate my claim I will explore the current debate on the normalisation of lesbian and 
gay sexualities. In the last decades, a good deal of authors have drawn attention to the changing face 
of homosexuals’ social struggles: if in the past the general discourse about homosexual sexualities 
was the vehicle for a broader critique of hegemonic conceptions of sex, love, family, and kinship, 
today’s campaigns for homosexual rights are chiefly characterised by the pursuit of legal recognition 
and social acceptance under the aegis of the principle of equality. Studies on this transition are 
abundant and well documented.2 Nevertheless, my primary intent will be to focus on this issue so as 
to understand whether it can be read as the response of liberal regimes to a challenge that brings into 
question a model – the nuclear family based on coupledom – which is claimed to be both a natural 
unit and the cornerstone of society. 
 
Meanings as a principle of vision and division 
 
Wittgenstein’s (2009, § 225) famous contention that “[t]he use of the word ‘rule’ and the use of the 
word ‘same’ are interwoven” aims to convey the idea that the first instantiation of a conduct by an 
agent and its reiteration on the part of other agents is key to the genesis of a rule. On this account, 
rule is synonymous with standard, while the latter is neither an abstract prescription nor the residue 
of a statistical recurrence. Something becomes a rule when it is adopted as a standard, that is, when 
it serves as something that allows performing a given action in the same way it was performed in a 
previous, paradigmatic instance. This first instance is paradigmatic because it determines the relevant 
conditions where the action has to be performed and offers a benchmark against which any further 
instance has to be assessed. Thus, the standard is an exemplar instance of a class to which it belongs, 
but for this very reason, it “steps out of its class in the very moment in which it exhibits and delimits 
it” (Agamben 1998, p. 22). In this regard, applying a word in the appropriate circumstances is the 
                                                 
1
 By “liberal law” or “the law of liberal regimes” I mean the legal systems of a range of political communities that share 
a specific cultural, historical, and socio-political tradition and are characterised by features such as constitutionalism and 
the rule of law. Despite significant differences in their actual legal and political mechanisms, these features are typical of 
both common law and civil law systems. Needless to say, differences among countries affect the way in which laws are 
produced and enforced or rights are established and recognized. And yet there are specific elements that pertain to the 
deep grammar of the national states emerged in Europe between the end of the confessional wars and the two world wars 
that, by and large, can be regarded as distinctive elements of liberal legal systems. For a broad (historical and conceptual) 
portrayal of how these systems have developed, as well as similarities and differences among them, see Costa and Zolo 
2007. 
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same as following a rule, to such an extent that grasping a meaning entails being involved in the 
practice whose borders are drawn by the paradigmatic instance.  
This explains why Wittgenstein was so dissatisfied with the so-called picture theory of language 
(Hunnings 1988), which claims the meaning of a word to be the object that the word stands for. Such 
a view neglects the relevance of practices in the establishment of meanings. The first pages of 
Philosophical Investigations are entirely devoted to revealing the shortcomings of this conception of 
language. Wittgenstein excoriates the claim that what one needs to do in order to illustrate the 
meaning of a word is point to the object that the word aims to denote – like a teacher who wants to 
explain the meaning of a word to her pupil by ostention. Wittgenstein believes that what makes an 
act of ostention successfully illustrate the meaning of a word, and what allows a pupil to grasp the 
meaning of a word when the teacher points to the object to which the word refers, is the fact that the 
“normativity of the ostensive training of the novice is provided by society in the form of the teacher” 
(Williams 1999, p. 221). Ostention, as it were, forms part of a broader practice, whereby the teacher 
transfers to her pupil the skills for using the word in the appropriate circumstances. 
In brief, acquiring a language and handling meanings amount to getting access to a practice and 
therefore to understanding what is appropriate in what circumstances. If this is true, then one’s ability 
to assess the appropriateness of a circumstance eventuates in one’s ability to determine when the 
situation is the same as the one in which she was explained how to use a given word. Speaking a 
language requires a practical skill in recognising sameness in different situations. This sameness, 
however, is not an inner property of the situation itself. As Mary Douglas (1987, p. 58) puts it, it 
would be “naïve to treat the quality of sameness, which characterizes members of a class, as if it were 
a quality inherent in things […]. Comparison of cultures makes it clear that no superficial sameness 
of properties explains how items get assigned to classes”. This is because sameness is the product of 
the practice itself, where a group of people stably associate the same words to the same objects in 
compliance with the paradigmatic instance. To put it otherwise, the meaning of a word and its 
implications come into light only within the relevant practice. In clarifying his methodological 
premises, David Schneider (1990, p. 4) insists on this point: “Simply knowing that a word can have 
many meanings, and simply knowing which are the many meanings a word can have, are not enough. 
What is necessary to know is which meanings apply when, and which of the many meanings does not 
apply or is not relevant under what circumstances”. 
 This makes sense of Wittgenstein’s (2009, § 199) conclusion that “[t]o follow a rule, to make 
a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions)”. This juncture 
recapitulates Wittgenstein’s argument. If one follows a rule, then she is doing the same thing that she 
and others did in previous circumstances and that she and others will do again when appropriate 
circumstances arise (Baker and Hacker 2009, pp. 49-50). But Wittgenstein’s insistence on rules being 
customs intends to remark that rules have no intellectual connection with the performance of an action 
in compliance with them (Taylor 1993). When agents guide their actions with reference to rules and 
explain what they do with reference to the rules that govern them, most of the times they perform a 
role, that is, they act as reporters, superiors, and chess players. Most of the times agents take on a role 
and abide by the rules that constitute such a role without any intellectual mediation between rules and 
their performance. Agents act as members of an institutional framework that bounds their practical 
knowledge and gets them to behave in accordance with the role they play in the here and the now.  
Wittgenstein’s lesson comes down to the conclusion that the bare connection between words 
and objects does not say anything substantial about the meaning of the former unless this connection 
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is viewed through the lens of its first instantiation. Needless to say, in the flexible and dynamic 
scenario Wittgenstein has in mind, every application of a rule is placed in an intrinsic (and never 
mirroring) relationship to the paradigmatic instance. Sameness is not determined by comparison with 
a primeval instantiation, as every application of a rule renews and re-instantiates the latter. Moreover, 
the practice is always exposed to change as a new instance is taken as paradigmatic, in which case a 
new practice would be brought into life. However, within the actual practice the criteria to determine 
what is the same always depend on whether or not subsequent instantiations can be cognised and 
recognised (not so much intellectually as in the agents’ actual conduct) in the light of a paradigmatic 
instance. 
In other words, meanings always rest on a threefold relationship among words, objects, and the 
practice where the relevant connection between words and objects is established. Hence, acquiring 
meanings entails entering into an institutional framework and being trained to perform rules in 
accordance with the relevant circumstances demarcated by this framework. The very acquisition of 
meanings ipso facto instructs the members of an institutional framework on what to do in what 
circumstances and in compliance with the roles delineated therein. There is a coincidence between 
the cognitive side of the teaching-and-learning process and the pragmatic side of acquiring the skills 
that are indispensable in order for one to be part of a given institutional framework. This coincidence 
is superbly captured by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), as they shed light on the 
cognitive aspect of being involved in a practice and knowing what, within this practice, words stand 
for. In the picture they paint, there is a first-order objectivation of meanings, the process by which 
meanings are attached to things, and a second-order objectivation of meanings (which the authors 
call “legitimation”), whereby new meanings are produced that integrate the meanings already 
attached to things. The acquisition of the second type of meanings is key to the acquisition of the first, 
to such a degree that the latter cannot take place without the former. Berger and Luckmann write: 
 
Legitimation “explains” the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. 
[…] It is important to understand that legitimation has a cognitive as well as a normative element. […] It 
always implies “knowledge” as well. For example, a kinship structure is not legitimated merely by the 
ethics of its particular incest taboos. There must first be “knowledge” of the roles that define both “right” 
and “wrong” actions within the structure. The individual, say, may not marry within his clan. But he must 
first “know” himself as a member of this clan. This “knowledge” comes to him through a tradition that 
“explains” what clans are in general and what his clan is in particular. […] Legitimation not only tells the 
individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why things are what they 
are. In other words, “knowledge” precedes “values” in the legitimation of institutions (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966, p. 111). 
 
Perhaps it should come as no surprise if Bourdieu mentions the same taboo when he introduces 
the parallel between categories and “accusations”. In The Logic of Practice he explains how the 
categorisation of family structures are endowed with the symbolic power to constitute groups and to 
assign relative power to members. Yet, people have access to this structure by being instructed in the 
meanings of the words (say, sister) which constitute its framework and carry with themselves all the 
practical imperatives related to them. Accordingly, the ostensive teaching “this is your sister” is 
designed to instruct the brother on what he is supposed do to and not to do as a member of the kinship 
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structure. Bourdieu continues by saying that, in the structuration of the social world, categories reveal 
their  
 
etymological sense of collective, public imputations (kategoreisthai originally meant to accuse someone 
publicly), collectively approved and attested as self-evident and necessary. As such, they contain the 
magical power to institute frontiers and constitute groups, by performative declarations (one only has to 
think of all that is implied in a phrase like ‘She’s your sister,’ the only practical statement of the incest 
taboo) that are invested with all the strength of the group that they help to make” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 170).3 
 
 In summary, not only do meanings circumscribe practices, define roles, and prescribe the 
conducts one has to perform when she takes on such and such a role. Meanings also incorporate and 
reflect power differentials that exist in the social world and make people learned about them. 
To conclude, the light thrown thus far on the dialectic relationship between the cognitive and 
the pragmatic aspects of acquiring meanings tells us something important about the function of this 
process in the social realm. As rules give birth to institutional structures,4 they define relationships 
and hierarchies in the social space where practices take place. In this framework, meanings instruct 
people on what to do in given circumstances, what they are required to do when they take on a given 
role. Meanings, in this regard, operate as “cultural units”, as they constitute “a set of rules which 
specify who should do what under what circumstances” (Schneider 1980, p. 5). In short, the 
organisation of the social realm as well as the constitution of groups within it rest on the production 
of meanings that allow members to take up a shared account of the institutional setting and, on the 
basis of it, to understand and follow the rules that are attached to their roles. This process, as I have 
argued above, is primarily carried out through the transmission and acquisition of the meanings that 
are constituted within the practice and, at the same time, constitute the practice. In this way, on the 
one hand, sameness is demarcated by the set of meanings that subjects come to possess and through 
which they come to adopt a “principle of vision and division” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 8). On the other 
hand, this very process makes subjects learned about the hierarchies and differentials of powers that 
meanings embody and confirm. This is evidence that the innocuous process of teaching and learning 
that Wittgenstein considers as key to humans establishing and following rules reveals itself as key 
also to the constitution of groups within society and the allocation of power among members.  
 
A Schmittian detour: from exception to normality 
 
One of the theoretical virtues of Schmitt’s theory of law and politics is that it clearly brings to the 
surface the political nature of the process of signification in such a way that the intrinsic relationship 
between meanings and the institutional framework where they are produced is completely revealed. 
Meanings, he believes, mark out the territory of sameness by enabling people to determine what is 
the same as what. This is why political power has inevitably to do with meanings. And, eventually, 
what is Schmitt’s sovereign if not a social semiologist?5 In effect, the decision of the Schmittian 
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 Bourdieu here is concerned with kinship categories and how they “institute a reality” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 172). However 
it is my claim that the process he describes extends to the general activity of producing categories and attaining distinction. 
4
 I examine the process that leads loose and flexible sets of rules through institutionalisation in ANONYM. 
5
 Famously, the opening lines of Schmitt’s Political Theology conjure up the figure of the sovereign as the supreme 
decider on a state of exception, that is, a situation where no social and a fortiori legal order is in force: “Sovereign is he 
who decides on the state of exception” (Schmitt 2005, p. 5; translation slightly revised). As I will argue later on, the 
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sovereign is intended to establish and stabilise a system of visible, perceptible, non-indifferent, 
socially pertinent differences – as Bourdieu (1998, p. 9) would have it – based on which people can 
recognise the enemy, or rather, the group or entity that is jeopardising the sameness of the political 
community. Schmitt’s binary exception/decision aims to explain what permits a community to make 
the distinction, crucial to the community’s own existence, between what is the same and what is 
different. In The Concept of the Political Schmitt exalts this understanding of politics when he avers 
that the foundational, existential conflict between friends and enemies is already-and-always 
contained in the semantic backdrop of the language of politics: “[A]ll political concepts, images, and 
terms have a polemical meaning. [They] are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is 
to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated” (Schmitt 1996, pp. 30-31).  
These quotations, however, demonstrate that Schmitt in the 1920s still believes that sameness 
is conditional upon difference and distinction: first comes the exception, then comes normality. In 
that respect, Bourdieu and the Schmitt of the 1920s seem to concur, for both believe difference to be 
the existence condition for sameness. Something difficult to explain and capture, something magic 
and marvellous must be given which produces difference and enables the members of a given group 
or community to recognise each other: either the miraculous intervention of a god-like sovereign à la 
Schmitt6, or the very mysterious act by which the state categorises reality and allocates stocks of 
power à la Bourdieu7. 
Nevertheless, Schmitt himself came to realise how faulty this assumption is. Let me trace the 
path that led him to reject the idea that sameness is created by a sovereign. This will be key to 
understanding Schmitt’s salient contribution to the conceptualisation of sameness. 
Schmitt is well known for his contention that norms, in exceptional times, are inert and useless. 
His tirade against theories that focus on the way norms function in ordinary life was chiefly meant to 
stress how vital it is for a robust understanding of politics and law to determine what is beyond the 
transient, everyday effectiveness of a legal order. Against Hans Kelsen’s claim that what comes 
before a valid constitution enters into force it is not for legal scientists to investigate, Schmitt argues 
that a theory concerned with law’s ordinary activities is of little use. In Political Theology, he boldly 
claims that a theory of law must be primarily concerned with what happens when the daily order is 
suspended, when there is no order at all and everything is menaced by incipient chaos. In other words, 
a sound theory of law, Schmitt believes, should never take the existing order for granted and should 
tackle the crucial question of where this order comes from. On his reading, the theory of law reveals 
itself as a theory of sovereignty, one that is able to identify the fountain of the order, which is to say, 
the sovereign.  
It is worth highlighting that Schmitt’s insistence on the exception as the central focus of every 
genuine theory of sovereignty is instrumental in a sounder comprehension of the nature of norms: “It 
would be a distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurisprudence if one were 
to say that the exception has no juristic significance […]. The exception appears in its absolute form 
when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must be first brought about” (Schmitt 2005, 
                                                 
sovereign’s decision proves effective when it successfully identifies the existential enemy (that is, the one whose existence 
poses a threat to the existence of the political community) and thus provide the background against which friends can 
recognize each other. 
6
 “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology” (Schmitt 2005, p. 36). 
7
 “Nomination is, when we stop to think of it, a very mysterious act which follows a logic quite similar to that of magic 
as described by Marcel Mauss. Just as the sorcerer mobilizes the capital of belief accumulated by the functioning of the 
magical universe” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 51). 
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p. 13). Accordingly, when he writes that “the rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything” 
(Schmitt 2005, p. 15), he does not want to belittle the role of norms in the life of the law. Rather his 
aim is to stress something relevant about them: norms are placed in an ontogenetic relationship to the 
exception, such that the former emerge out of the latter. In this light, Schmitt’s analysis in Political 
Theology proves a subtle theoretical argument: if we intend to make sense of the legal order, we need 
to investigate its origin. In the 1920s his conviction is that the origin of the law is a decision whereby 
the sovereign cuts out – that renders the German ent-scheidet, deriving from the Latin de-caedit and 
then de-cidit – the societal element which threatens the general homogeneity of the community. In 
this framework, however, sovereign is anyone who turns out to be able to make the proper decision, 
or rather, the one which successfully indicates the enemy and, based on that, creates an order. 
In sum, in order to properly understand the “institutional turn” that I will shortly introduce, it is 
important to keep in mind that Schmitt’s first concern in Political Theology is theoretical, as he 
himself emphasises by quoting Søren Kierkegaard: “If one wants to understand the general correctly, 
one only needs to look around for a true exception” (Schmitt 2005, p. 15). He aims to explain 
normality by investigating what brings it into life and to account for the way norms work by 
identifying their fountainhead.  
Between the 1920s and the 1930s and above all early in the 1930s, Schmitt realises his 
decisionistic understanding of the legal order was flawed, as it fell short of its end: it failed to explain 
how norms work in everyday life and what brings normality into existence. He reaches the conclusion 
that, much as the exception helps explain the way a legal order is brought into force, it does not 
explicate how it reproduces and thrive. The celebrated theorist of the exception converts to a view 
that does not necessarily deny the relevance of such a key political notion, but certainly confines it to 
a liminal status. How come he reaches this conclusion? To cut a long story short8, Schmitt is prompted 
to revise his extreme and somewhat paradoxical view of an order created out of nothingness by his 
encounter with the theories of two prominent jurists, Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano. These are 
two towering figures of what is today known as “classic institutionalism”. I cannot explore their 
influential theories in this context. Suffice it to say that both these authors compellingly demonstrate 
that no legal order can be created ex nihilo, because it always constitutes the systematisation, or better, 
the institutionalisation of something which is produced by social actors within their social cradle in 
the practice of everyday life.  
Evidently, Schmitt’s new understanding of the legal phenomenon is barely reconcilable with 
an overemphasis on exception and decision, so much so that he comes to reject exceptionalism. In 
1933, in the preface to the second edition of Political Theology, he points out that there was something 
missing in his previous theoretical framework: “I now distinguish not two but three types of legal 
thinking; in addition to the normativist and the decisionist types there is the institutional one” (Schmitt 
2005, p. 2). Decisionism, he explains, merely focuses on one “moment” and thus “runs the risk of 
missing the stable content inherent in every great political movement” (Schmitt 2005, p. 2). Whereas 
the Schmitt we are more familiar with was so affectionate to the exceptional and yet rare 
circumstances in which no order is at work and a sovereign decision has to be made, the Schmitt of 
the 1930s is looking for something stable and durable. Although the decision taken in exceptional 
moments is what brings a legal order into existence, there is something else that prompts a community 
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8 
 
to durably comply with the norms of this system. This missing element is what once Schmitt himself 
used to consider far less interesting, that is, normality.  
In Schmitt’s institutionalism normality is by no means just a further element of the broad 
picture. Normality reshapes the ontogenetic relationship he had originally posited between norms and 
exception, to the extent that the latter loses much of its relevance. Schmitt de facto rejects his claim 
that the normal proves nothing and the exception everything. In his writing of the 1930s, and in 
particular in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, he brings this theoretical amendment into light 
and provides a sound (albeit incomplete) justification. Although infected by his infelicitous and 
deplorable allegiance to the Nazi regime, in these writings Schmitt elucidates why normality is key 
not only to the subsistence, but also to the emergence of a legal order. The contents of the law cannot 
be originated by a sovereign decision. The sovereign is no longer an absolute decider over a dramatic 
disorder. By capitalising on his institutionalist predecessors, Schmitt recognises that without a set of 
social practices being stably developed in the social realm, no ordering decision can take place. 
To offer a few more details, Schmitt’s novel “institutionalist decisionism”9, which he calls 
“concrete-order thinking” (Schmitt 2004, p. 47), deems the law to be the shell of a substance which 
is the upshot of a long-standing and laborious activity of a social body. His new perspective can be 
summarised as follows. Law is structurally based on a dialectical relationship between normality and 
abnormality, where normality is comprised of the patterns of rules and conducts developed within the 
most widespread and age-old institutions that make a community that community10. Conversely, 
abnormality is what deviates from the courses of action, rules, and interactional models that 
characterise these institutions, and thus threatens the normality they nurture. In stark contrast to his 
decisionist phase, however, Schmitt now claims that the dialectic between normality and abnormality 
is at work well before a sovereign claims to instate the political order. The order of normality comes 
before any exception and needs no creative intervention on the part of a miraculous decider. If this is 
so, then law is not the upshot of a creation ex nihilo, but an instrument that is meant to select patterns 
of rules and conducts developed within institutions and grant them the status of compulsory standards, 
binding on the entire community. The law is a sieve that separates the institutional models that are 
believed to be crucial to the existence of the community and that folds them in its (coercive) arms. 
What is, then, the space Schmitt reserves to politics? Certainly, it loses the foundational role it 
played in the theory of exception. Nevertheless, there is an essentially political element involved in 
the creation and maintenance of an institutional setting, in that the law – under the judicious guidance 
of a Leader – has to perform a process of selection whereby a restricted set of institutional practices 
are assigned the legal status of compulsory standards. This selection, in Schmitt’s view, is key to the 
subsistence of a community, because it provides the criteria of normality whereby a range of 
individuals are turned into a homogenous community. In other words, normality is the possibility 
condition for sameness, as the members of a body politics mutually recognise each other in the light 
of a joint commitment to a shared ethical substance.  
Although the reiterated reference to a Leader are to be attributed Schmitt’s opportunistic choice, 
his institutional theory nicely explains how politics is all about the taking care of the normality which 
social subjects produce in their everyday life and that is continually exposed to the capricious 
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 Schmitt’s notion of institutions is far from refined and, in the examples he provides here and there, he puts together 
different types of institutions, such as the family, the army, or the church. In other words he fails to distinguish institution 
if term of the verbalisation of rules, formalisation of knowledge and degree of specialisation. 
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flexibility of social change. Moreover, he illustrates how normality and sameness are cognate 
phenomena, as the same emerges out of the normal, while the normal is what it is only insofar as it 
succeeds in indicating what is the same. Doubtless, whereas the reference to a homogenous, thick, 
almost visible ethical substance at the heart of the community is far away from Wittgenstein’s flexible 
and varying forms of life, Schmitt’s new understanding of an intrinsic relation between sameness and 
normality bear many resemblances to the latter’s. Not only does sameness come before and provide 
the conditions for difference to exist. Much more importantly, the site where sameness is produced is 
the practice itself, where agents are directly involved in the categorisation of reality, the production 
of meanings, the creation of rules. 
 
Performative citation and the creation of sameness 
 
Let me try to recapitulate my argument thus far. My goal in the preceding pages was to draw attention 
to the relationship among sameness, normality, and the constitution of social groups. I argued that, 
on account of the special nature of meanings, the very process of transmitting meanings is the primary 
vehicle of sameness. At this point, however, I incurred the dilemma of what is the source of sameness. 
I turned to Schmitt’s troubled relation with normality because it casts light on the weaknesses of the 
idea that sameness is yielded by the act of a political demiurge. If in the 1920s it was already clear to 
his mind that “[t]o recognize a class of things is to polarize and to exclude” and that such process 
always “involves drawing boundaries” (Douglas 1987: p. 60), after a decade Schmitt comes to the 
conclusion that sameness can never be the outcome of a miraculous decision: sameness pre-exists 
any human activities, from the making up of meanings to the introduction of legal norms. Sameness, 
now Schmitt reckons, is to be found in the normal life of widespread institutions, which behoves the 
law to protect and support. However, his texts do not offer a thorough theoretical justification for his 
penetrating insight.  
Although Wittgenstein takes no notice of the political relevance of the production of sameness, 
he has clearer ideas on how the whole process is originally set in motion. It is my claim that his 
remarks provide a sound theoretical background for the scenario painted by Schmitt.  
Wittgenstein believes that the dilemma of how sameness comes about can be solved by looking 
at the way in which standards materialise. Though he cannot be said to be sufficiently clear on this 
point, I believe David Bloor to offer a compelling interpretation of Wittgenstein’s basic perspectives. 
Bloor (1997, p. 33) argues that standards emerge out of a self-referring activity. More in particular, 
a practice of citing is involved, whereby a given performance becoming a standard is occasioned by 
one’s “commenting on the performances of others, and of one’s self”. In other words, the rule is 
brought into existence within and through the practice of citing and invoking it at the very moment 
of its first appearance. Therefore, in a truly Wittgensteinian spirit (Voltolini 2010), the dilemma 
dissolves. The activity of creation is entirely resolved into the practice itself when people draw their 
attention to a given performance and tease it out of the flexibility of social interaction by providing, 
most often unintentionally, a stable, objectified, and transmissible description of it.  
Bloor (1997, p. 33) points out that, once the performance is rendered into a standard, it becomes 
a “medium of self-understanding”. The standard turns out to be that in respect to which one performs 
subsequent actions and accepts to be assessed. The standard turns into a means for giving account of 
a certain set of actions, and, precisely because of that, produces sameness and distinction at one and 
the same time. It truly becomes the Bourdesian principle of vision and division that allows a group to 
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exist qua group and to recognise those who do not belong to it. In short, the construction of sameness 
gets underway with a performative citation of something in respect to which something else is to be 
done and assessed. Once the performative force has exerted its effects on a given instance, this 
becomes paradigmatic and provides the monolingual mindset for social agents to share a common 
account of their surroundings and to assess and criticise each other. The aura of obscurity and magic 
that surrounds the production of standards dissipates when we realise that the agents themselves 
yields rules and institutions through their own performative acts.  
This analysis exhibits two major strengths. On the one hand, it rehabilitates the role of social 
subjects in the production of institutional frameworks. For, it is the citational activity of individuals 
that singles out performances and turns them into standards. On the other hand, this activity is not 
relegated to individual’s mind, as for example John Searle’s (2010) influential analysis of the 
institutional world submits. Such a creational enterprise requires individuals to be involved in an 
actual and public interactional exchange. While actions must be concretely performed in the social 
theatre in order for agents to comment on them and to render them into paradigms, agents are required 
to concretely perform other actions under the guidance of such paradigms. This process is entirely 
performative, to the extent that what resides in people’s mind turns out to be almost irrelevant11. 
(This interpretation of) Wittgenstein compellingly demonstrates that no miraculous, sacred, and 
supra-personal power is involved in the creation of institutional standards ex nihilo. The integration 
of such insights into the nature of institutions with Schmitt’s institutionalist view of how legal norms 
work in relation to a pre-existing normality is conducive to a convincing account of the way in which 
the legal order of liberal regimes oversees and protects social order.  
In what follows I will try to expunge the conservative and reactionary elements of Schmitt’s 
institutional view and to plunge it into the analytical framework based on Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
standards. The upshot of such an unholy union will be an analytical framework able to account for 
how the liberal legal order operates to assure sameness and to defend normality. The hypothesis I will 
advance is that the legal norms of the liberal legal order allow, so to speak, a “bounded” renegotiation 
of the institutional models that they incorporate, one which confirms the models and reinforce the 
normality that underpins them.12 
 
Normalisation at work? the changing face of same-sex struggles 
 
By and large, the standard view on liberalism is that it gives birth to a political setting that seeks to 
accommodate a plurality of views about how individuals should live their lives (Kelly 2004). To this 
end, liberal policies do not endorse any theory of personal morality, but rather set limits on the scope 
of action of the various moral and political perspectives that inhabit democratic countries. Liberalism 
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 I provide a more detailed argument for the key role of publicness in the production of standards in ANONYM. with a 
view to justifying H.L.A. Hart’s (genuinely Wittgensteinian) notion of practice. 
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of rules is innately based on a polarisation that involves exclusion and the drawing of boundaries (see also Cooper 2004: 
Chap. 3). Accordingly, my main goal is not to launch an attack on the political and legal structure of liberal states as such. 
Rather, I will seek to lay the foundation for a sounder understanding of what liberal regimes offer in the accommodation 
of difference, with a view to determining whether their offer may at times turn out to be a disguised strategy to prompt 
unnormalized subjects to trade in their troubling differences for an acquiescent assimilation. 
11 
 
achieves that by opening up a bordered sphere of mutual interaction where everybody can contribute 
to the government of society. Within this public sphere, people can freely and jointly choose the terms 
of cooperation and co-existence, while the state, by enforcing rules that protect individual freedoms, 
makes sure that in the private sphere nobody can harm anybody else. In the private domain, people 
cannot be hindered from conducting their lives as they see fit, provided that their actions are not 
detrimental to the life of others. In short, a definite set of freedoms and the sacredness of the 
public/private divide comprise the basic idiolect of the law of liberal legal regimes: in the public 
sphere people make decisions on what concerns everyone as a member of the political community, 
whereas in the private sphere they are free to organise their existence in accordance with the models 
they prefer and the ideas of good life they hold. 
Negotiations about what belongs to the private and what to the public have always been a source 
of polemics within liberal polities. Among the many issues that cut across this boundary, the family 
and its regulation turns out to be a very crucial one, for two main reasons. On the one hand, the family 
is regarded as an indispensable pillar of human association, the one that prove foundational to the 
existence of society (Calhoun 2000). On the other hand, the domain of the family is regarded as the 
domain of the intimate and the private, to the extent that some liken the distinction between public 
and private to the one between the impersonal and the intimate (Cooper 2004). Hence, governing the 
family entails control on a key site of the private domain whose effects on the domain of the public 
are uncountable13. It is no coincidence that nowadays most of the struggles of sub-state groups 
(whether religious or ethnic) in many Western countries concern family governance and the degree 
of autonomy that groups could or should be granted in the regulation of intimate relationships (Witte 
& Nichols 2013). 
At present the traditional understanding of family as a monogamous relationship between a man 
and a woman and their progeny is under siege, as in a growing number of Western countries same-
sex couples are officially allowed to enter marriage while in others they can register as civil partners. 
Although in some states the recognition of same-sex unions is still a hot topic, it can hardly be denied 
that the way to a deep rethinking of the notion of family and its essence has been paved. Nonetheless, 
according to some scholars (Barker 2013; Franke 2012; Richardson 2004), the current reworking of 
this vital practice, which has to do with the very existence of liberal states, is being conducted in such 
a way as to achieve two principal goals: to reinforce the role of family within the political community 
and to integrate ‘good’ lesbians and gays in order to minimise much more threatening unconventional 
sexualities.  
Diane Richardson (2004) dwells on how the extension of rights connected to a fully-fledged 
citizenship ends up being instrumental in “the ‘normality’ of being gay,” that is, the full inclusion of 
homosexuals in the body politic as ‘good citizens’ who deserve complete integration into mainstream 
society. For Richardson, there are grounds to suspect that the current enormous attention to 
homosexual rights is conducive to the reinforcement of a traditional idea of sexuality which forms 
part of the upbringing of the good citizenship. More in particular, framing gay rights in terms of 
recognition of same-sex unions is fostering two key aspects of the traditional Western view of sexual 
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life: first, in spite of family being a vital element of civil society, the organisation of intimate 
relationships has to be couched as a private matter; secondly, its regulation has to be modelled on the 
conventional idea of union based on a long-term, committed, monogamous relationship.  
Other empirical studies support the conclusion that the progressive convergence between 
straight and gay ways of living is sanctioning the triumph of the Western model of family, that is to 
say, the “young, white, married, heterosexual, able-bodied, family with bread-winning husband, 
dependent wife and children who share a residence and whose central relationship will be 
monogamous and last forever” (Weeks, Heaphy, and Donovan 1999, p. 706). Even though such 
conquests cannot be hastily demoted to forms of new subjugation (Stychin 2004), critics point out 
that the recognition of same-sex rights is both swelling the ranks of good, normal citizens and creating 
new types of excluded and marginalised sexualities (such as prostitutes, divorcees, promiscuous, 
unwed parents and so on).  
In a recent cross-national study on the recognition of same-sex marriage, Nicola Barker (2012) 
draws on an extensive range of literatures – mainly feminist and queer – to argue that marriage is 
currently being presented as the only way to get access to a set of right, benefits, and privileges that 
are necessary to the governance of unions. This, she claims, is not only affecting the agenda of LGBT 
movements, but even more importantly prevents a careful assessment of what “it actually is that some 
same-sex couples are seeking access to and what it means to be married, legally, socially or 
ideologically” (Barker 2012, p. 12). Barker’s point is that the pursuit of equal rights and 
responsibilities through marriage takes it for granted that legal ‘rights and responsibilities’ can really 
“provide ‘the solution’ to inequality” (Barker 2012, p. 169). In reality, as other studies seems to attest, 
what is being re-enforced is the seemingly natural connection between romantic love and marriage, 
which was typical of heterosexual coupledom, to the extent that respectability and acceptability can 
only be obtained through the lexicon of long-life, monogamous coupledom sanctified by marriage 
(Ammaturo 2014; ANONYM.; Franke 2004; Ruskola 2005). 
In short, whether in civil partnerships or conventional marriage, unions between persons of the 
same sex are now legally regulated in most European member states, while the US and other European 
countries seem well on the way to removing legal impediments to them. Despite this, as the critiques 
I mentioned so far contend, the revision of social values and legal norms about homosexuality is both 
a drive for change and a reassertion of conventional ideals about proper kinship relations. In 
particular, same-sex marriage is believed to reinstate a conventional ideal of marriage, which only a 
few years ago was on the wane. Radical and left-wing critics maintain that current legal developments 
relative to marriage and unions are (at least partly) affected by biases that theorists define as 
“heteronormative” (Warner 1993) – whereby the form and structure of non-heterosexual relationships 
are modelled on existing heterosexual ones – and “homonormative” (Duggan 2003) – whereby 
homosexual individuals struggle to get access to those state institutions that erstwhile liberationist 
movements viewed as the root cause of their oppression. As a consequence, if contemporary legal 
regulation and social perception (despite regional variations) have come to terms with the idea, 
developed in the fields of social and cultural anthropology (Franklin and MacKinnon 2001; Schneider 
1984), that kinship is not necessarily based on genetic ties, the pivot around which transformations 
in family law are being brought about is the conventional family. Current reformulations of the basic 
legal notions of family and family life leave untouched a seemingly unvarying trait of Western 
kinship, namely, the nuclear couple as the building block of legitimate kinship. Acceptability and 
respectability are conferred on same-sex unions only as long as they are amenable to the couple-
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form, and are willing to enjoy the legal status which is bestowed on their unions as nuclear units 
(Cobb 2012).  
 
How the liberal legal order thinks: secondary legal norms as preferential pathways  
 
How could the push towards sexual equality eventuate in the reassertion of conventional coupledom? 
To answer this question I need to look at the nature of the basic instruments of legal regulation through 
the lens of the analysis developed in the first three sections. 
In his pioneering critique of same-sex marriage as a respectability-conferring tool, Michael 
Warner laments the reduction of homosexual rights to a matter of individual preference that the state 
is called upon to accommodate insofar as it is obliged to grant its citizens equal treatment. In doing 
so, he sheds light on the public character of this transition. At face value, the transformation of the 
homosexual imagery brought about by normalisation has to do with the private choice of homosexual 
individuals who want to marry in order to regulate their relationship in keeping with official legal 
provisions and to send out a message of mutual and enduring love. In reality, according to Warner 
(1999, p. 96), marriage is hardly “something you do privately, as a personal choice or as an expression 
of taste”. This seemingly private act turns out to be a public operation that impinges on homosexual 
sexuality in such a way that some homosexuals – those who are ready to come to terms with an 
institution that former liberationist movement regarded as a source of oppression14 – come to swell 
the ranks of the good citizens and to be accepted (as alike) by the bulk of the society. At the same 
time, however, others, less respectable and less acceptable sexual minorities, whether homosexual or 
not, continue to be pathologised and marginalised as unable to fit the good society15.  
In this regard, Warner’s can be viewed as a critical attempt to chart how the liberal legal order 
operates on the social domain as far as the protection of normal sexuality is concerned. When Warner 
(1999, p. 82) claims that marriage “sanctifies some couples at the expenses of others”,  he is not 
simply pointing his finger at the benefits that some people can get while others are forced to lag 
behind. Warner’s main concern seems to be of a conceptual type, especially when he addresses law’s 
“selective legitimacy” (1999, p. 82). The crux of his argument is that marriage, as a legal institution, 
is not just a distribution mechanism for rights and privileges among citizens. Much more significantly, 
this mechanism wields a symbolic power that establishes a system of differences among citizens. For, 
one of the main consequences of law’s selective legitimacy is the disciplining of those who do not fit 
the category produced by the legal system, those who cannot follow the path of the power-conferring 
rule of marriage and thus are structurally unable to bring new states of things into existence: “As long 
as people marry – Warner (1999, p. 96) points out –, the state will continue to regulate the sexual 
lives of those who do not marry”16. These people fall outside the practice of good sexuality, supported 
and reflected by state policies, because this practise possesses a specific nature that is incompatible 
with the rules, models, and dynamics developed in the practices of “deviant” sexual minorities. 
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In the remaining pages of this article, capitalising on the arguments developed in the preceding 
sections, I would like to contribute to the critical literature on homosexual normalisation by 
developing an alternative hypothesis on why such a process is at work and how it is connected to the 
legal regulation of sexuality. In effect, much as Warner’s and other queer theorists’ analyses prove 
highly instructive, they fail to fully identify the role played by the law and its relation to social 
signification17. To achieve this aim, I would like to look at that type of rules that in jurisprudential 
thinking are generally defined “secondary” or “power-conferring” (Hart 1994). These are rules that 
do not prescribe or prohibit specific conducts but confer authority in two different ways. On the one 
hand, they enable private individuals to bring new states of things into existence as long as their 
actions are performed in accordance with specific legal provisions – to be private legislators, as Hans 
Kelsen (1945, pp. 136-137) put it. On the other hand, these rules empower officials to recognise, 
amend, and apply other rules18. Power-conferring rules represent a pivotal element of a juridico-
political setting inasmuch as they encapsulate shared and stable models of organisation and mandate 
specific conducts to comply with these models. In particular, when they are addressed to private 
individuals, secondary rules indicate what is to be done both in order to change one’s status (for 
example, from single to wedded) and in order to make one’s actions have specific effects on reality 
(for example, to bequeath an estate). In other words, the law prescribes certain pathways to make it 
sure that one’s doing something may have the effects one intends to bring about. 
The common description of this type of rules can be misleading, for it tends to convey the idea 
that people are genuine creators of something. For instance, in his ground-breaking analysis of the 
concept of law, H.L.A. Hart (1994, pp. 34-35) claims that, unlike rules that confer powers, rules that 
prescribe conducts (primary rules) are structured in such a way that “we can distinguish clearly the 
rule prohibiting certain behaviour from the provision for penalties to be exacted if the rule is broken, 
and suppose the first to exist without the latter.” Hart means that behind a rule of conduct there is a 
model that predates the rule, while no such model can be found behind a power-conferring rule. The 
latter type of rule confers legitimate authority (whether private or public) to constitute entirely new 
entities. This reading, however, omits to say that in order for a secondary rule to confer power, a 
specific model has to be officially established as the paradigm. Here Wittgenstein’s investigation on 
the emergence of standards and Schmitt’s analysis of normality prove revealing. On the one hand, 
Wittgenstein illustrates how, once this model has been officially instituted as the standard model, the 
actions that fall within its scope are thought, performed, and assessed as correct or incorrect in its 
light. On the other hand, Schmitt explains that, despite any claim to individual freedom and equality, 
legal standards are intended to protect pre-existing social standards and to prevent the appearance of 
potentially harmful alternatives. Hence, pace Hart, there is no power-conferring rule that is not meant 
to enshrine a pre-existing model and to repress (at least as an inadvertent outcome) unwanted types 
of conducts that could threaten the model. 
This is evidence that secondary, power-conferring rules contribute to giving a specific shape to 
human co-existence. As Schmitt realised in the 1930s, rules defining specific models of conduct 
within given institutions are key to (what he views as) a solid and vigorous political community. The 
                                                 
17
 Relevant exceptions are works by queer theorists with legal background, such as e.g. Katherine Franke, Janet Halley, 
and Teemu Ruskola. Yet, my analysis differ from theirs insofar I claim that tracing the effects of legal regulation entails 
a sound analysis of social practices and their relation to the legal order.  
18
 The literature on secondary rules and the confusions that surround their nature is abundant. For a detailed discussion, 
with specific reference to Hart’s legal theory, see ANONYM., where readers can find a detailed reference list.   
15 
 
state, he believes, has the duty to protect such legally recognised models and must make sure that 
legal officials are vigilant on their strict application. This explains why one of founding fathers of 
contemporary libertarianism, Friedrich von Hayek, bemoaned the growing relevance of this type of 
rules in Western democracies. In The Principles of a Liberal Social Order Hayek writes: 
  
The character of those universal rules of just individual conduct, which liberalism presupposes and wishes 
to improve as much as possible, has been obscured by confusion with that other part of law which 
determines the organization of government and guides it in the administration of the resources placed at its 
disposal. It is a characteristic of liberal societies that the private individual can be coerced to obey only the 
rules of private and criminal law; and the progressive permeation private law by public law in the course 
of the last eighty or hundred years, which means a progressive replacement of rules of conduct by rules of 
organization, is one of the main ways in which the destruction of the liberal order has been effected. (Hayek 
1967: pp. 168-169)19. 
 
In other words, Hayek considers those rules whereby the state determines how society should 
be organised as the most incisive instrument in the hands of the government to rule human practices 
and to restrict spontaneous and voluntary modes of self-organisation. It is no coincidence that, as a 
glaring example of a state which illiberally employs legal norms to mould society, Hayek (1967: p. 
169) refers to Schmitt’s institutional portrayal of the German post-positivist legal order: Schmitt 
applauds the outright replacement of cold and bloodless norms of conduct with the norms that emerge 
out of concrete institutions and instruct Germans on how to conduct their lives in keeping with their 
age-old tradition. Hayek intuits the pervasive effectiveness of this legal instrument: secondary rules 
present themselves as inoffensive legal norms that empower people to do things with the law, whereas 
its strategic use on the part of the state may trigger a process of subjection and normalisation. Hayek’s 
contention is that the state holds sway on the life of its citizens not by the use of fearful emergency 
powers (which can be sometimes the case, but less often than not). The state achieves this end by 
inducing citizens to go down certain paths, that is, to follow secondary rules that enable people both 
to have recourse to law’s stock of legitimate force when disputes arise and to send out a message 
about their status and desires. Marriage is a case in point: far from being a mere opportunity for 
citizens to act as “private legislators”, it is a straightjacket procedure to get the benefits that the state 
associates to a specific, well-defined institution.  
 
The challenge to normality and the immunity response 
 
Getting back to my initial analysis, I would like to argue that, more effectively than rules that prohibit 
or forbid conducts, rules that confer powers assure sameness by establishing roles and therefore by 
demarcating institutional figures that provide cognitive guidance on how to do things as role-players. 
Roles however are neither only nor primarily determined by the set of mandatory actions to be 
performed in specific circumstances. For they are characterised first and foremost by the stock of 
knowledge that the role-player is expected to possess (whether explicitly or not) in order to perform 
these actions when appropriate circumstances arise. Within an institutional framework marked out by 
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power-conferring legal rules, these rules are not addressed to individuals as law-abiders, but to the 
members of a practice that is regulated by the law. Moreover, as Schmitt’s institutional analysis 
reveals, the law does not forge institutional frameworks, but sanctions their existence and enforces 
the rules that are already at work within them (although legal recognition inevitably brings about 
changes and adjustments on the rules and structures that the law enforces). The pre-legal structure of 
institutional frameworks is so crucial to their existence and reproduction that, Schmitt avers, every 
legislator, and anyone who applies the law, is bound to face the dilemma of “either to accept and 
apply the given concrete legal concepts of the institution or to destroy the institution” (Schmitt 2004, 
p. 54 – emphasis added). 
Schmitt’s words offer a valuable key to the understanding of the normalisation process. The 
institutional framework that the law recognises and regulates is hardly a neutral field of interaction 
sensitive to the innovations introduced by members. It is a normative context whose existence is 
deeply rooted in a specific institutional history that binds changes to scarcely flexible paths. In the 
case of marriage and family, roles like mother and father, daughter and son, sister and brother, are 
not fungible labels that easily adapt to morphing circumstances. They are the accretion of rules that 
are supported by specific instructions and offer role-players a cognitive prism through which they 
approaches reality when they play that role. As I showed above with reference to the incest taboo, 
being a sister is not as much a matter of complying with rules as it is of knowing (at least implicitly) 
what conducts and expectations the set of rules that define the role of sister entails.  
Doubtless, those who defend the progressive character of allowing same-sex couples to marry 
make the argument that, as the language of everyday life and its meanings change over time, so do 
institutional frameworks and their stock of knowledge. The revision of consolidated practices 
(whether promoted by legal reforms or by spontaneous societal developments) produce significant 
changes in the way people perform these practices and understand themselves when they play roles. 
For example, the role of parents in the era of assisted reproductive technology gets significantly 
altered as the possibilities of procreation multiply and the relevance of the dyad mother/father 
decreases (Hayden 1995; Dempsey 2010). On this account, like the revision of parenthood prompted 
by new technologies, the revision of the meaning of conventional marriage prompted by legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage seems destined to cause havoc in the traditional understanding of 
kinship and to pave the way for alternative models to sprout. These metamorphoses would play as 
concurring elements in a process able to confer visibility on the invisible and to make unliveable lives 
more liveable, like Judith Butler’s Antigone’s push toward “a new field of the human, achieved 
through political catachresis, the one that happens when the less than human speaks as human, when 
gender is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws” (Butler 2000, p. 82).  
Nevertheless, the structural limits imposed on such a political catachresis are several. Social 
change is not a free-floating process taking place in a vacuum. The cognitive resources employed to 
apply meanings in a subversive and potentially transformative way have to be found in the very 
semantic repertoire that is being put into question. The challenge to the bounds demarcated by the 
lexicon of the practice, which can be transformed only by reference to its meanings, and is supported 
by scarcely malleable legal provisions, ignites a reaction whereby deviant conducts and their 
meanings are integrated. Though this integration effects changes within the practice, the latter is 
capable of accepting what can be accepted and rejecting what could be lethal to the practice as a 
whole. In this scenario, Roberto Esposito’s (2010) thesis of the category of immunisation being key 
to the modern paradigm of community can be of help. He explains that, whereas the words community 
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and immunity share the reference to the term “munus” (whose intricate meaning runs from office and 
post to gift and obligation), the “immune” is the opposite of the “common”. Modern political 
communities, Esposito points out, are founded on an immunity impulse that is “the clearest kind of 
negation” (Esposito 2010, p. 16), especially when it becomes foundational to the community. In fact, 
the community founds and recognises itself through an excision, whereby that which threatens the 
stability of widespread practices has to be eradicated. In my reading, however, this process of removal 
rarely takes the shape of overt and violent exclusion. Law exerts its exclusionary effects by means of 
a semantic renegotiation of meanings whereby the boundaries of normality have to be revised to fend 
off greater challenges. In liberal regimes, state law’s immunity reaction expresses itself through 
violence only in extreme cases. More often than not, sameness is secured by prompting people to 
follow specific paths as they intend to exert legally (and publicly) recognised effects on reality.  
Legal regulation reveals itself as a form of control on the production and revision of meanings: 
as soon as alternative practices emerge, these are selected according to their aptness to be integrated 
into the existing institutional frameworks. Law’s chief immunity weapon is assimilation. Access to 
the set of benefits and rights associated to official institutions can be obtained only insofar as the 
conducts pursuing recognition can be narrated with recourse to a practical vocabulary which proves 
able to speak the language of the law (ANONYM.). In this reading, normality figures as the main rule 
of the game, whereas sameness turns out to be the only way to play by this rule. Accordingly, as 
Bourdieu, Douglas, Schmitt, Schneider, and Wittgenstein (as far as I understand them) suggest, 
normality and sameness do not form part of an imperceptible surveillance apparatus that holds sway 
on acquiescent subjects, consciously deployed by conservative and neoliberal juridico-political 
devices. Much more deeply tied to the very nature of human categorisation, the selective mechanism 
of liberal states builds on, and exalts, human beings’ necessity to polarise and exclude, and thus to 
produce common meanings to provide mutually intelligible accounts of their practical environment.  
In sum, the centripetal force of standard models, especially when they are backed by the 
legitimacy of legal recognition, unleashes its normalising effects precisely by allowing partial 
renegotiations over the traits that determine sameness, that is, over the characterising features of the 
roles that people are required to perform within institutional framework. In the case of marriage and 
its extension to homosexuals, legally married couples will no longer be those comprised of a man and 
a woman, but those comprised of two persons who choose to constitute a family and aim to make 
their reciprocal love public. If the difference of sex ceases to be a necessary feature, the link between 
marriage and a set of values, such as coupledom, romantic love, mutual fidelity, and the desire to rear 
children will even be reinforced, essentially because these are the elements that allow former excluded 
minorities to reach out to the heart of their fellow citizens (who nurture the same desires) and to get 
access to marriage. In much the same way, sameness will no longer imply reference to gender and 
blood, but to choice and mutual commitment: those who intend to make public their reciprocal choice 
are all alike and deserve the right to regulate their relationship in compliance with legal measures that 
once were reserved to couples of different sex. In the face of it, the arguments developed by opponents 
and supporters of same-sex marriage turn out to be impressively similar, based on a historical 
understanding marriage that is bound up with a set of social norms that safeguard the borders of the 
conventional monogamous family (Zivi 2014). 
To conclude, let me answer a potential objection. My analysis might seem to suggest that there 
is no way out of normality, so much so that the reproduction of sameness, and, a foriori, marriage 
and other existing institutions are the only, though costly, options for sexual minorities to get the 
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social visibility they strove for and the rights they deserve as citizens of a liberal state. However, this 
is not what my analysis implies. It is true that, as I argued so far, sameness and normality are 
constitutive of there being social groups and political communities. Yet, the most effective way to 
counter their harshest outcomes (such as abjection, marginalisation, and invisibility) is a widespread 
awareness of the role of sameness and normality. The seemingly neutral language of the law helps 
legal and political institutions to disguise their tendency to secure order through their selective 
mechanisms20. The institutional language of the state inevitably tends to treat as unspeakable and thus 
as non-existent those who suffer from the negative externalities of its policies. In the face of it, the 
frank admission that the law has to make exclusionary decisions to assure the stability of everyday 
life would grant those excluded more visibility, and would not confine them in the invisible space of 
marginal pathologies. They would not be regarded as deviances, eccentricities, and abnormalities, but 
as alternative options that pose a challenge to the existing normative framework and the values it 
supports. This is why I believe that a more open, perhaps harsher, confrontation among alternative 
models would convey the idea that the existing standard is just an instance of a reiterated action that 
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